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ARTICLES
THE DEVIL IN DISGUISE:
HYBRID NEWS-COMMERCIALS AND




Broadcast journalists and advertisers endure an uneasy alliance.
Because of increasing use of newscast content as an advertising vehicle,
this difficult relationship may soon present constitutional problems for news
organizations.
Advertising pays the bills, but good journalism requires independence
from undue influence by sponsors. Edward R. Murrow, the CBS news
pioneer, once infuriated his corporate superiors by declaring that if "news
is to be regarded as a commodity, only acceptable when saleable, then I
don't care what you call it-I say it isn't news."'
This article will examine a modem manifestation of the news-
commercial conflict, sneaking sponsors' messages into purported news
stories. Such shadowy advertisements are, in the words of Consumer
Union's executive director Rhoda H. Karpatkin, "just commercials
pretending to be news."2
Turning impartial reporters into commercial endorsers obviously
violates journalistic ethics.3 Osborn Elliott, a former dean of Columbia
* Mr. Mitchell is a writer based in Tucson, Arizona. He worked as a broadcast journalist from
1966 to 1993. J.D., (1991) University of Louisville. B.S., (1988) Regents College, University
of the State of New York.
1. ANN M. SPERBER, MuRROW: His LIFE AND TIMs 539 (1986).
2. Rhoda H. Karpatkin, Memo to Members. CONSUMER REPORTS, Oct. 1991, at 639 (emphasis
added).
3. The American Society of Newspaper Editors' ("ASNE") Code of Ethics urges member
journalists to gather and report information to the public accurately, honestly and impartially.
Furthermore, members are to strive to conduct themselves in a manner that protects them from
conflicts of interest. BRUCE M. SWAIN, REPORTERS' EThics 111 (1978). These aspirational goals
are not always respected, hence the problems discussed in this article.
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University's journalism school declared: "Number one, they shouldn't do
it. Number two, [if they do] it should be revealed that this is the arrange-
ment .... That's a fine line across which one shouldn't pass."4 Former
CBS News president Fred Friendly explained his network's concern: "[I]f
certain subjects are scheduled because they are sponsored, it follows, con-
versely, that certain other programs might not be broadcast because they are
unsponsorable."5
Furthermore, as this article will demonstrate, mixing advertisements
and news may jeopardize the First Amendment protections of news
broadcasters, since commercial speech enjoys a lower level of constitutional
protection than does noncommercial speech.6 This may be true even when
the commercial speech has or purports to have a noncommercial dimension.
Consequently, broadcast journalists may thus be more vulnerable to
defamation lawsuits. They may violate federal communications laws
requiring sponsor identification and federal trade regulations prohibiting
deceptive advertising. Journalists may invite regulation, fines, or even prior
4. Joanne Lipman, TV Series on Personal Finance Stirs Debate Over Separation of News and
Advertising, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1988, at A23. Dean Osbom Elliott was referring to "Planning
Your Financial Future," a six-part series airing on cable television's Financial News Network
("FNN"), which has since been absorbed by CNBC. The series featured FNN anchors and other
journalists, but it was actually a paid commercial for The New England, an insurance and
financial services company. The New England invested $365,000 in the production. Id
5. FRED W. FRIENDLY, DuE TO CnmcuMSrANcES BEYOND OUR CONTROL 207 (1967).
Friendly's fear is as well-founded today as it was twenty-five years ago. One network even
hesitated to expand coverage of the Persian Gulf war, despite enormous public interest, because
sponsors were skittish about associating their products with war coverage. Bill Carter, Few
Sponsors for TV War News, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1991, at Dl. Some newspapers are dropping
entire categories of news for which few advertisers can be found, such as science. Fred Jerome,
Bad News for Science News, N.Y. TnMES, Sept. 26, 1992, at A21. Even more troubling is the
tendency of some broadcasters and publishers to avoid news material that may offend advertisers,
such as consumer protection reports and price comparisons. American Society of Journalists &
Authors Newsletter, Oct. 1992. As television revenues weakened, advertisers became more
insistent on favorable coverage and stations became more susceptible to advertiser threats.
Stephen Waldman, Consumer News Blues, NEWSWEEK, May 20, 1991, at 48. See generally G.
Pascal Zachary, Many Journalists See A Growing Reluctance to Criticize Advertisers, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 6, 1992, at Al.
6. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) ("There is no longer
any room to doubt that what has come to be known as 'commercial speech' is entitled to the
protection of the First Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded
'noncommercial speech.'"); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983)
("[O]ur decisions have recognized 'the "common-sense" distinction between speech proposing a
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation,
and other varieties of speech."') (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56
(1978)).
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restraints on material they pass off as news, without the constitutional
protections upon which they have come to rely.
Part fl of this article presents a short history of commercial influence
on newscasts. Part I][ will examine the differing levels of First Amend-
ment protection for independent news coverage and for commercial speech.
Part IV discusses the current application of commercial speech rules. Part
V presents an example of the troublesome news-commercial hybrid,
followed by an examination of resulting problems: less protection against
defamation actions, fines, and prior restraints. This part includes a
discussion of the commercial speech problems posed by allowing indepen-
dent journalists to serve as commercial endorsers. Finally, Part VI offers
a conclusion as to the current status of the law and the appropriate stance
for broadcast journalists on the news-commercial question.
I. THE RISE OF SPONSORED NEws STORIES
American journalism depends on advertisers. In colonial times, half
of all newspapers bore the name "Advertiser" in their titles.! In 1989, the
fifty leading U.S. advertisers spent approximately $41 billion, much of it
on media which deliver news as a sole, primary, or significant product.'
The cost of broadcast advertising alone was $22 billion.' At local
television stations, newscasts are the principal source of revenue, although
entertainment dominates the program day.'0
In broadcasting's early days, sponsors often bought entire programs,
including news, and dictated their content." One journalism chronicler
7. Rodney A. Smolla, Legacy: A Conversation With James Madison, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1991,
at 51. Professor Smolla notes that during colonial times, there was no established legal distinction
between political and commercial speech. Id.
8. Advertising Age, Sept. 25, 1991, quoted in Tm WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTs
307 (1993). The figure includes sums spent for advertising in newspapers and magazines, cable
television, and network and local television and radio.
9. id. The $22 billion figure was up from $18 billion only two years before. House
Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Exports, Tourism, and Special Problems, May
2, 1989, available in WESTLAW, FTC File (testimony of William MacLeod, director of Federal
Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection). Even as the recession cut into advertising,
total broadcast revenues rose by more than one billion dollars in 1989. THE WORLD ALMANAC
AN BOOK OF FAcrs 319 (1992).
10. Janice Castro, The Sky's the Limit, TIME, Nov. 27, 1989, at 72.
11. SALLY B. SMrM, IN ALL His GLORY 161 (Touchstone ed., 1991) (biography of CBS
founder William S. Paley).
19941
232 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14
said that before 1930, "radio news was almost totally corrupt."'2 For
example, in the 1930's, NBC radio allowed its evening news roundup to be
produced at the sponsor's headquarters, under the direction of the sponsor's
public relations department. 3 Therefore, if an advertiser did not like what
was said on the newscast, the journalist responsible could lose not only his
sponsorship, but his job. 4 Robert Lemon, a veteran NBC News execu-
tive, described the news as "whorishly done."' 5
With the passage of the Communications Act of 1934,16 advertise-
ments were required to be identified as such.
All matter broadcast by any radio station for which any
money, service, or other valuable consideration is directly or
indirectly paid, or promised to or charged or accepted by, the
station so broadcasting, from any person, shall, at the time the
same is so broadcast, be announced as paid for or furnished,
as the case may be, by such person .... "
Although the purpose of that statute was to prevent audience
deception,' s many news programs still danced to an advertiser's tune.
Reuven Frank, a former NBC News president, revealed that an early
television newscast, NBC's Camel News Caravan, was prohibited by its
tobacco company sponsor from showing "No Smoking" signs, live camels
(considered too ugly to represent the company) or anyone smoking a
cigar. 9 An exception was made for one famous cigar smoker, Winston
Churchill, but not for comedian Groucho Marx."
Eventually, national prosperity, broadcast expansion, and greater
public reliance on radio and television news increased electronic journ-
alism's independence and influence.2 The combination of regulation and
changing times encouraged responsible broadcasters to insulate their news
12. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE POWERS THAT BE 35 (1979).
13. Id
14. Id
15. RON POWERS, THE NEwscAsTERs 21 (1977) (quoting Robert Lemon, a news executive
widely credited with elevating quality and ethics at NBC's Chicago station).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1934).
17. Id.
18. Public Notice, Sponsorship Identification of Broadcast Material, 40 F.C.C. 69,71 (1960).
19. Louis Rukeyser, Bad News, N.Y. TIMEs BOOK REVIEW, July 14, 1991, at 14 (review of
RnuvEN FRANK, OUT OF THIN Ant: THE BRIEF WONDERFUL LwE OF TELEVISION NEWS (1991)
(memoirs of former NBC News president)).
20. Id.
21. See generally KEN AULErrA, THREE BLIND MICE: HOW THE TV NETWORKS LOST THEIR
WAY (1991) (shows growth of networks prior to incursion of new technologies and corporate
takeovers).
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departments from commercial pressure.22  Advertisers could sponsor
programs, but they could not influence content or impose their slant on the
news." Today, most serious journalists consider the separation of news
from advertising as basic a rule as the separation of church and state.24
Recently, however, regulation has eased. While federal law still
requires sponsor identification, a Federal Communications Commission
regulation states that merely mentioning the name of the advertiser or its
product is generally sufficient 2
Furthermore, the economics of broadcasting have changed drastically.
News budgets have been reduced, and news independence has suffered as
pressure from advertisers and sales departments has increased.' Observ-
22. See FRIENDLY, supra note 5, at 206-07.
23. Id. This article is concerned only with news-commercials broadcast at the behest of a
sponsor. Not considered here are the more subtle pressures of the commercial environment which
sought to keep news and public affairs as conforming and uncontroversial as the rest of television.
See generally ALEXANDER KENDRICK, PRIME TIME: THE LIPE OF EDWARD R. MURROW (1969).
Nor does this paper deal with overt advertiser demands or vetoes in entertainment programming.
For example, the syndicators of a planned program on new books will not permit criticism of the
books, because advertisers will pay to have their titles included. Meg Cox, TV Stations See
Literary Future: Shows on Books, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1993, at B. Advertisers refused to buy
time on a program dealing with the suicide of a gay teenager, effectively blocking the program.
Bill Carter, NBC Defends Move On "Quantum Leap," N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 1991, at C18.
24. Thomas Toch, Homeroom Sweepstakes, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 9, 1992, at
86.
25. Section 317 of the Communications Act now includes the following, after the original
text:
Provided, [t]hat 'service or valuable consideration' shall not include any service
or property furnished without charge or at a nominal charge for use on, or in
connection with, a broadcast unless it is so furnished in consideration for an
identification in a broadcast of any person, product, service, trademark, or brand
name beyond an identification which is reasonably related to the use of such
service or property on the broadcast.
47 U.S.C. § 317 (1993). The regulation promulgated by the Federal Communications
Commission reads:
In the case of broadcast matter advertising commercial products or services, an
announcement stating the sponsor's corporate or trade name, or the name of the
sponsor's product, when it is clear that the mention of the name of the product
constitutes a sponsorship identification, shall be deemed sufficient for the
purpose of this section and only one such announcement need be made at any
time during the course of the broadcast.
47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(f) (1993) (emphasis added).
26. Wayne Walley, Local News Sales Feel Recession, ELECrRONIC MEDIA, Sept. 23, 1991,
at 25. See also BROADCASTING, Oct. 7, 1991, at 12.
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ers are consequently alarmed that television news "is taking on the
trappings of public relations puffery and huckstering for advertisers." ''
The sales director at a New Hampshire station complains of the pressure to
keep editorial integrity in the news because of increasing client identifica-
tion with certain news features."
For example, a hospital might agree to purchase commercial time on
a television newscast if the station airs a "news segment" on health care
adjacent to the hospital's commercial.29 Thus, the hospital receives not
only a regular commercial, but a "lead-in" credit?0 to the news segment
and a so-called news report which focuses audience attention on health
matters. In some cases, the hospital might even provide the videotape and
specify the persons to be interviewed. Once that news segment has a
sponsor, it is likely to remain part of the newscast even if producers or
editors consider other material more important."
Many journalists fear that this practice gives advertisers new and
improper selection and treatment of news stories. One leading commentator
on the business ethics of broadcasting stated the problem clearly: "A
journalistic organization that allows these two elements [news and
advertising] to blur undermines public confidence in everything else it does
and stands for. The principle is so fundamental and the appropriate policy
27. S. L. Harrison, Monday Memo, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 5, 1993, at 42.
28. Walley, supra note 26, at 25. See also BROADCASTING, Aug. 19, 1991, at 45.
WMUR-TV, Manchester, N.H. and the Bank of New Hampshire have teamed up
to produce a series of 30-second consumer-tip spots featuring WMUR-TV anchor
Karen Appel. In the spots, Appel provides basic information for viewers on per-
sonal and small-business finances. The ads are paid for and sponsored by the
bank, but they do not pitch the bank's services.
Id
It is only fair to note that the print media also suffers from the mingling of news and
advertising. See Randall Rothenburg, Messages from Sponsors Become Harder to Detect, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1989, at D5.
29. Hospitals like to purchase hybrid commercials because their needs and the needs of
broadcasters are complementary. News producers need to fill time with "dateless" material, that
is, features which can be prepared in advance and aired anytime. Health stories are ideal for this
purpose. Broadcast research indicates that health and medical stories are of interest to audiences.
Hospitals, like other businesses, are highly competitive, using advertising to reach potential
patients. Any exposure that adds credibility to the hospital's message is especially helpful, hence
the desire for a news "tie-in."
30. A "lead-in" is an announcement such as 'Tonight's health report is brought to you by
ABC Hospital." A similar brief announcement after the program is called a "lead-out," as in,
'Tonight's money report was brought to you by XYZ Bank."
31. Jim Mitchell, Monday Memo: A News Investment Commentary, BROADCASTING, Oct. 7,
1991, at 12.
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so obvious that there should be no need for comment. But need there
is.t
32
The appropriate policy forbids mixing news and advertising. While
that may seem clear to a news ethicist, it may appear murky to a judge who
must separate the highly-protected news material from the less-protected
commercial material. Recently, the United States Supreme Court articulated
this point in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, InC.3 3 where a city govern-
ment attempted to limit the number of newsracks used by commercial
advertising publications, while imposing no such controls on the racks of
traditional newspapers.' Such a case "illustrates the difficulty of drawing
bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct
category," Justice Stevens wrote for the Court.35 Clearly, much of the
material in ordinary news media is commercial speech and some material
in promotional media is not "core!' commercial speech.36
Does this mean that commercial and non-commercial elements of
speech, once mixed, are inextricably intertwined? 3 Recent developments
indicate that they are not.
I. SPEECH PROTECTIONS
A. Freedom of the Press
It is hardly necessary here to restate the importance of a free press
or its special position in our hierarchy of constitutional values. A few
points will provide adequate foundation for the discussion to follow. The
First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press.""3 The protection is applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.39 Courts have consistently
32. John Morton, This Is Not An Advertorial, WASH. JOURNALISM REV., June 1988, at 12.
See also Mitchell, supra note 31.
33. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
34. Id. at 1509.
35. Id. at 1511.
36. Id at 1513.
37. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 806 (1988).
38. U.S. CoNsT. amend. L
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law"). By 1925, the Supreme Court assumed that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected fundamental rights and "liberties" such
as freedom of speech and of the press from impairment by the states. Gitlow v. New York, 268
1994]
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adhered to the principle "that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open" and that a free press serves that end.' A series
of press cases established the "actual malice" standard to provide breathing
room for discussion of public officials and public figures.4' Furthermore,
the Court concluded that public figure plaintiffs may not use the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress to circumvent the "actual malice"
standard for libel.42 In Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo,43 the Court em-
phatically declared that the choice of material in a newspaper should be
determined by the publication's own editors, not by public officials.' "It
has yet to be demonstrated," Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court,
"how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have
evolved to this time."4s
Paradoxically, at the time of Tornillo, the Court had recently upheld
restrictions on newspaper content. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations,46 a newspaper was barred from printing
an employment advertisement listing jobs as "male" or "female" because
such gender distinction was contrary to equal opportunity employment
laws.47 The Court was careful to limit that holding, stressing that it
authorized no restriction on content or layout, on stories or commentary
originated by the newspaper, its columnists, or contributors.4' The
advertisements were not originated by the news organization; they were
"classic examples of commercial speech." '49 The Court did not hesitate to
examine the newspaper's components to decide which were journalistic, as
opposed to commercial, in nature.
Pittsburgh Press dealt only with newspapers, but its holding clearly
applies to broadcasters as well. The Supreme Court recently restated the
U.S. 652, 666 (1925). This was the first indication by the Court that Fhrst Amendment guarantees
were "incorporated" in the Fourteenth Amendment. GERALD GuNTHER, CONSTITuTIONAL LAW
1004 n.2 (11th ed. 1985).
40. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
41. Id. at 279-80 (discussing public officials: "actual malice" defined as knowledge that the
defamatory speech was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false); see Curtis Publ. Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (discussing public figures).
42. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
43. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
44. Id at 258.
45. Id.
46. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
47. Id at 378-79.
48. Id at 391.
49. Id at 385.
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established rule that broadcasting may be more closely regulated than other
forms of communication."°
B. Limits on Commercial Speech
From 1942 until the mid-1970's, commercial speech appeared to
have no First Amendment protection. The matter was governed by
Valentine v. Chrestensen,5' wherein the Court upheld a ban on the
distribution of handbills and other advertising on public streets.52 The
First Amendment would forbid banning all communications by handbill, but
no such restraints applied "as respects purely commercial advertising.
' 5
The distinction was further established by the holding that door-to-door
solicitation of magazine subscriptions could be prohibited,' but door-to-
door publicizing of a religious meeting could not, because it involved no
commercial element." The historic holding of New York Times v.
Sullivan, expanding press latitude in libel cases, was not derived from a
news story, but from an advertisement.56 The advertisement was protected
50. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993). Broadcasting has been
allowed less leeway under certain circumstances. The right of speech does not include the right
to use the broadcast facilities without a license. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943); this presumably means licensees must conform to valid restrictions on
licensed activities. The government may block the broadcast of indecent material, largely because
of the uniquely pervasive presence of radio and television, and their easy accessibility by children.
Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978). The
government may forbid the advertising of harmful products on radio and television. Capitol
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Cir. 1971), affid mem., sub nor. Capitol
Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (upholding 15 U.S.C. § 1335
(1969), banning cigarette commercials). But even here, the crucial distinction appears to be the
form of the message, not the medium: broadcasters can still air pro-smoking views in forms other
than commercials. Capitol Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 584.
51. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
52. Id. at 53-54.
53. Id. at 54.
54. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
55. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 n.1 (1943).
56. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-59 (1964). The advertisement at issue
was placed by several persons and groups to protest actions taken against civil rights demonstra-
tors in the South. The defamation plaintiff was a police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama,
who claimed that he was libeled because certain actions were falsely attributed to the police. Id.
at 258.
1994]
238 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14
because it dealt with a matter of substantial public concern, as opposed to
commercial interests.5"
In 1975, the Court began to embrace some protection of commercial
speech. Finding that an advertisement for legal abortion clinics contained
matter of public interest, not just a proposal of a commercial transaction,
the Court struck down a ban on such advertisements." That left unsettled
the fate of speech which merely proposed a commercial transaction.
The following term, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,59 the Court found that purely commercial
speech does not lack all First Amendment protection.' The speech
involved was a list of prescription drug prices.61 Writing for the Court,
Justice Blackmun noted that even an entirely commercial message may be
of public interest.62 Since a pharmacist could cast himself as a commenta-
tor on drug prices and detail several competing prices to prove his point,
the Court reasoned that it makes little difference whether he does so in a
commentary or an advertisement. 63
The Court stressed that commercial speech could still be regulated.'
Appropriate restrictions on the time, place, and manner of commercial
speech remained permissible.65 Government could deal effectively with
false, deceptive, or misleading speech.66  Advertisement of illegal
transactions could still be forbidden, as in Pittsburgh Press.6 7 The Court
57. Id at 266. The determination of "public concern" has plagued the Court since the New
York Times decision. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,43 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(applies New York Times standard to discussions of matters of public or general concern, without
regard to plaintiff's public or private status); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(returning emphasis to status of plaintiff, forbidding defamation liability without fault and
requiring actual malice for punitive damages in private plaintiff cases). The concept of "speech
of public concern" has returned recently to the Court's discussion of First Amendment protection.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
58. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975).
59. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
60. Id at 762.
61. Id. at 749-50.
62. Id. at 764.
63. Id. at 764-65.
64. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770-73.
65. Id. at 771 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-08 (1940)).
66. Id at .771-72 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 425 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 and n.10 (1961)).
67. 1 at 772.
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also noted that it need not consider the special problems of the electronic
broadcast media.68
Significantly, the Court appeared to recognize sharp distinctions
between commercial speech and news reporting.69 "Commercial speech"
is more verifiable than other forms, Justice Blackmun.wrote, because the
advertiser knows more about his product or service than anyone else and
can easily verify his own claims."0 Because of that "hardness" of
commercial speech, inaccurate statements need not be tolerated for fear of
silencing a speaker.7 At this point, the Court might almost have
anticipated the modem news-commercial hybrid when it suggested that the
special qualities of commercial speech "may make it appropriate to require
that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such
additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to
prevent its being deceptive. . . .They may also make inapplicable the
prohibition against prior restraints."72
Indeed, Virginia Pharmacy emphasized not the right of the commer-
cial speaker, but the importance of accurate commercial information to
individuals and society." As commentators have noted, the decision's
primary focus was not on the advertiser's right to speak, but on the interests
of consumers and the public in a free flow of information to assure
informed decision-making. 4
C. Commercial Speech Defined
There is general agreement on a "core notion" of what constitutes
commercial speech: that which does no more than propose a commercial
68. Id at 773 (citing Capitol Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 582).
69. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id (emphasis added). See also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (The Court
suggested that even protected commercial speech might require "some limited supplementation,
by way of warning or disclaimer.").
73. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763. "Mhe particular consumer's interest in the free
flow of commercial information... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the
day's most urgent political debate." Id. "It is a matter of public interest that [consumer
purchasing] decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed." Id. at 765.
74. Linda S. Ewald, Content Regulation of Lawyer Advertising: An Era of Change, 3 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHIcs 429, 443 (1990); MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA
LAW, 203-05 (4th ed. 1990).
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transaction.75 However, in Board of Trustees v. Fox,76 Justice Scalia's
majority opinion omitted the phrase "no more than" and said that whether
the speech "'propose[s] a commercial transaction' . . . is the test for
identifying commercial speech ... ." The Court thereby underscored
earlier declarations that speech may be commercial even though it contains
some noncommercial elements.71 "[We have made clear," the Court
stated, "that advertising which 'links a product to a current public debate'
is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommer-
cial speech. 79
There is also a firm notion of what is not commercial speech. Not
every advertisement is commercial.80 As noted earlier, the civil rights
advertisement at issue in New York Times v. Sullivan was noncommer-
cial.8" In addition, a mere reference to a specific product does not by
itself make the message commercial.' Finally, a speaker's economic
motivation will not alone turn his material into commercial speech. 3
However, the Court has found that a combination of all those fac-
tors-advertisement, mention of a product (or presumably of a service), and
economic motivation-provides strong support for a conclusion that the
message is commercial speech."
But can commercial and noncommercial speech be "inextricably
intertwined," as the Court had suggested in Riley v. National Federation of
75. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (citing Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,385 (1973)). But see Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), in which Justice
Powell's majority opinion defined commercial speech as "expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Id. at 561. Only a page later, the opinion
described commercial speech as "proposing a commercial transaction." Id. at 562. Justice
Stevens found the first definition too broad, noting that even Shakespeare may have been
motivated by money, and the second unclear, in that it might extend to a mere mention of a
product or service within an otherwise noncommercial discussion. I&a at 580 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
76. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
77. 1& at 473-74.
78. Id. at 474-75 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983)).
79. Id. at 475 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)).
80. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66.
81. 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1963).
82. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 (citing Associated Students for Univ. of California at Riverside v.
Attorney General, 368 F. Supp. 11, 24 (C.D. Cal. 1973)).
83. Id& at 67 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1974); Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966); Thornlill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)).
84. Id.
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the Blind, Inc.,' thus rendering the entire message noncommercial? They
can indeed be intertwined, Justice Scalia declared, but not inextricably,
unless the state had ordered them combined. 6 In Riley, the state required
charitable organization fundraisers to disclose in their solicitations of how
much money collected actually went to the charity." Justice Scalia has
found that absent such a government command, nothing requires the
inclusion of noncommercial speech within a commercial message.8
Combining the two would no more convert a sales pitch into protected
speech "than opening sales presentations with a prayer or a Pledge of
Allegiance would convert them into religious or political speech."' 9
It is important to note that courts will consider the commercial-
noncommercial distinction before the First Amendment questions arise.
90
The type of speech involved affects the way in which interests are
balanced.9' For example, false or misleading commercial speech will have
no First Amendment value at all.' On the other hand, under the rule of
New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny, noncommercial false assertions
of fact involving public figures will be protected if they are free of actual
malice.93 Analysis of the appropriate protection cannot begin without
determining the nature of the speech.94
85. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
86. Fox, 492 U.S. at 474.
87. Riley, 487 U.S. at 784.
88. Fox, 492 U.S. at 474.
89. Id at 474-75.
90. Id at 473. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated "the first question we confront
is whether the principal type of expression at issue is commercial speech." Id
91. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) ("sort of expression involved" is
relevant to balancing state interest against F'rst Amendment concern); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756-57 (1985) (plurality opinion) (type of speech
involved affects how the balance is struck).
92. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(commercial speech).
93. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
94. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (noncommercial speech:
"Under the F'wst Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea." However, false statements
of fact have "no constitutional value.").
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IV. REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Four years after the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. Court left open the question of how
commercial speech could be regulated, the Court set out a four-part test in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.
95
There, the state attempted to ban a utility company's advertising to promote
the use of electricity.96 The ban was ordered in late 1973, when there was
great national interest in promoting energy conservation, and extended in
1977.' To test the validity of the ban, the Court accepted the premise
that the disputed speech was commercial, since the state regulation applied
only to advertising intended to stimulate the purchase of utility services.98
With that determination made, the Court outlined an analysis to judge the
regulation of commercial speech:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be. misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.9
The last factor proved problematic. Justice Powell meant that if the
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction,
the excessive regulation would not be permissible."° This appeared to
be a "least restrictive means" test; indeed, Justice Scalia acknowledged this
even as he struck it down in Board of Trustees v. Fox.' "Necessary"
should not be interpreted too narrowly; the regulation must merely be
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective, Justice Scalia wrote. 02
95. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
96. Id at 558-60.
97. Id
98. Id. at 559.
99. Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566.
100. Id at 564.
101. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476 (1989) ('There are undoubtedly formulations in some of our
cases that support [the least restrictive means interpretation]-for example, the statement in
Central Hudson itself that 'if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited
restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive."') (citation omitted).
102. Id at 476-77.
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"What our decisions require is a '"fit' between the legislature's ends and
the means chosen to accomplish those ends' ... a fit that is not necessarily
perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is in 'proportion to the interest
served.""'03
The analysis of commercial speech regulation now follows a four-
step Central Hudson/Fox test:
1) If the speech is false and misleading, it has no protection and
may be regulated;
2) If the speech is not false and misleading, the court will ask
whether the asserted governmental interest in regulation is substantial;
3) If the interest is substantial, the court will ask whether the
regulation directly advances the interest asserted; and
4) If so, the court will determine whether the regulation is tailored
narrowly enough to achieve a reasonable fit with the asserted interest."°
V. COMMERCIAL NEWS
A. A Likely "Story"
Given the high level of constitutional protection for news, the lower
level for commercial speech, and the regulation standards described above,
consider the following hypothetical hybrid news-commercial item from a
television newscast aired by Local Broadcaster, Inc. pursuant to its
agreement with an advertiser.
As the commercial break ends, a hospital company logo appears on
screen. An announcer's voice says, 'Tonight's medical report is brought
to you by the Healthy Hospital, the leader in serving our community's
medical needs."
The news anchor then appears on screen, perhaps with a background
graphic featuring a caduceus" 5 and the words "Your Health." The anchor
reads, "In tonight's report on your health, we look into the continuing
development of lung transplant techniques in our city. Here is Rick
103. Id at 480 (citations omitted).
104. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
105. A representation of a staff with two entwined snakes and two wings at the top, often
used as a symbol to represent the medical industry. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 195 (9th ed. 1990).
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Reporter." Rick Reporter is a regular member of the news staff, seen often
on health and other stories and promoted as a member of the news team.
The taped report begins with interior shots of an operating room. A
print graphic at the bottom of the screen identifies the location as Healthy
Hospital, Downtown. Rick Reporter begins his narration with a brief
history of organ transplant surgery. Then he states, "In our city, Healthy
Hospital maintains the only fully licensed lung transplant facility."
The tape then shows a physician (identified by the traditional white
smock, a stethoscope around her neck, and a printed identification at the
bottom of the screen) who says, "Of course, another hospital here has
attempted to develop a lung transplant team, and we applaud their effort.
But they're not licensed to perform this surgery. Patients should carefully
investigate whether any experimental technique has been approved by our
state."
Rick Reporter then adds a few comments and signs off. The anchor
says, "Thank you, Rick. In just a moment, tonight's weather forecast."
This is followed by a clearly identifiable commercial message, promoting
Healthy Hospital's new childbirth center and urging expectant parents to
call for information.
A few days later, Hale & Hearty Medical Center sues Healthy
Hospital, the physician, and Local Broadcaster for defamation. Hale &
Hearty is the only other hospital in town known to have attempted a lung
transplant program. Contrary to the doctor's assertion, it is in fact licensed
to perform the experimental surgery. Hale & Hearty claims that the "news
report" was a false assertion of fact which tended to lower it in the
estimation of the community and to deter persons from dealing with it.
The situation catches the attention of the State Medical Review
Board, which has a rule against advertising any medical service or product
which is considered experimental. Lung transplants are considered
experimental. The State Board moves to enjoin Healthy Hospital and the
television station from airing further paid segments on lung transplants.
B. Defamation
For the purpose of argument, assume that the statement in the
"newscast" item is defamatory, and that the hospitals and their transplant
specialists are well-known in the medical field, frequently seeking and
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receiving publicity.'" Assume further that if the item was noncommer-
cial, it would be protected by the "actual malice" standard of New York
Times v. Sullivan; that is, a public figure's libel action would fail unless the
item was broadcast with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."° Finally, assume that actual malice could
not be proven in the case of a neutral, unsponsored report, resulting in
judgment for Healthy Hospital and Local Broadcaster.
But as noted earlier, courts will not even consider these matters until
they have ascertained the nature of the speech.' If the speech is
noncommercial, it will have full First Amendment protection. If it is
commercial, less protection will be accorded.
The hybrid news item cannot be classified easily as a mere proposal
to engage in a commercial transaction. Rather, it resembles the contracep-
tive advertisements at issue before the Supreme Court in Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp."° Those ads included socially useful information
on the subjects of birth control and venereal disease prevention."0 The
Bolger court suggested a three-part test, briefly noted in Part lI.C. above,
to categorize the speech as commercial or noncommercial."' If the
speech is an advertisement, contains a reference to a specific product, and
the speaker has an economic motivation, then the speech is probably
commercial." 2 An affirmative answer to any single question does not
render the speech commercial, but a combination of all three provides
strong support for a commercial characterization." 3
One part of Healthy Hospital's newscast segment, the typical, easily
identifiable "pitch" extolling the hospital's services, is obviously commer-
106. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342. 351-52 (1974). "Mhose classed as
public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order
to influence the resolution of the issues involved.... ITihey invite attention and comment." Id.
at 345. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 488-90 (1984).
Bose "actively solicited reviews" and thereby invited criticism of its audio system. Id at 488 n.l.
107. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
108. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
109. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
110. L at 62, 71.
111. Id. at 66-68.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 67.
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cial."1 4 The so-called news item presents a more sensitive question, but
the Bolger analysis supports a conclusion that the "report" is also commer-
cial speech. Certainly it is an advertisement. The Hospital's contract with
the station called for a health story, as well as a regular, easily identifiable
commercial. It contains a reference to a specific service, lung transplant
operations. Finally, the hospital clearly has economic motivation in
purchasing the airtime as a vehicle to create goodwill and increased
patronage.
The hospital may argue that it purchased the time and specified the
subject matter, but it exercised no control over the content. If the station
indeed maintained control of the script, interviews, editing, and other
essential elements, the hospital's position may be plausible. However, it
defies logic to claim that a story sponsored by Healthy Hospital would
receive utterly independent treatment. The station would be unlikely to
produce an expos6 of Healthy Hospital shortcomings or a list of its
competitors' superior services. " 5 By the same token, if the hospital did
control or significantly influence the item's content, it seems clear that the
"report" would be considered simply one part of an elaborate commercial
segment.
Consider again the Supreme Court's declaration in Pittsburgh Press,
that speech which originated with the news organization would enjoy full
protection.1 6 A sales contract to cover certain material suggests that the
item originated with the advertiser, not the journalists. Even without
written proof, the First Amendment will not prevent an inquiry into the
question of motivation: was it journalistic or commercial? In Herbert v.
Lando,"7 the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs suing a news medium for
defamation could inquire into the defendant's editorial process."I That
case involved a plainly noncommercial news report; the same conclusion
would be even easier to reach where commercial speech was at issue.
Recall that attempts to link a product or service to a topical issue will
not qualify commercial speech for heightened protection.119 As the Court
wrote in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
114. Such a "spot ad" is typical of those that need no specific announcement: 'This is a
commercial paid for by (name of sponsor)." The commercial nature of the conventional
advertising message is perfectly obvious. T. BARTON CARTER ET AL. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE FiFT ESTATE: REGULATION OF ELECTRONiC MASS MEDIA 289-90 (1986).
115. See Cox, supra note 23.
116. See supra text accompanying note 48.
117. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
118. Id. at 175.
119. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983).
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sion, corporations are entitled to full protection for "their direct comments
on public issues. There is no reason for providing similar constitutional
protection when such statements are made only in the context of commer-
cial transactions."'n Thus, even if Healthy Hospital's commercial was
part of a news discussion of medical issues, it would not qualify for
heightened protection.
Although the Supreme Court has confronted more than a dozen
commercial speech cases since 1977, 12 none have involved defamatory
commercial speech."n However, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit faced the problem in United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue
Cross."3 The case arose from a comparative advertising war between
two health insurance providers. 4 The defendant company contended that
it was entitled to heightened First Amendment protection because its
defamatory advertisement dealt with important issues of health care quality
and cost." 5 The Third Circuit rejected that argument: "[While we agree
that the quality, availability, and cost of health care are among the most
important and debated issues of our time, these particular advertisements for
specific health care products do not escape the commercial speech
category."' 6
If the court's reference to advertisement for specific health care
products hints at some greater protection for hybrid news stories which
avoid plugging a particular product or service, it must be remembered that
the decision rested largely on Central Hudson, which warned against
blurring the Supreme Court's line between commercial and noncommercial
speech. 27 The Third Circuit found that advertisers are prevented "from
120. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 n.5.
(1980).
121. Ewald, supra note 74, at 429. As Professor Ewald notes, about half the Court's
commercial speech cases involved state regulation of advertising by lawyers.
122. The Court has faced defamation questions in a commercial context, but this is not the
same as defamatory commercial speech. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., an
audio equipment manufacturer claimed to have been defamed by a review of its product in
Consumer Reports magazine. The speech at issue, the review, was clearly not commercial speech.
466 U.S. 485 (1984).
123. 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990).
124. Id at 917-20.
125. Id at 927.
126. Id at 937.
127. Id at 936 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 562 n.5 (1980)).
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immunizing, in effect, otherwise defamatory speech-behind the actual
malice standard afforded to core speech by the First Amendment-simply
by reference to an issue of public concem." 12
The Third Circuit announced another reason for refusing to apply the
New York Times actual malice standard to commercial defamation. The
defendant in Healthcare, Inc. argued that the other provider, by its own
advertisements, had become a limited purpose public figure. 29 In Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.,30 the Supreme Court defined limited purpose
public figures as those who "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved."' 3' But once again, the Third Circuit returned to the initial issue:
the nature of the speech. Although some of the advertisements touched on
matters of public concern, the court found, their central thrust was
commercial.1 32  Therefore, the advertiser must be considered to have
acted primarily to generate revenue, not to influence the resolution of
issues. 33  The court held that to find otherwise would allow corporate
advertisers permanent insulation behind the actual malice standard.134
With respect to the prior hypothetical, an unsponsored news story
would have been classified as noncommercial speech and would have
enjoyed the protection of the actual malice standard. Assuming that the
physician's statement was made without knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not, and assuming that the station acted
in similar good faith, judgment would be given for the defendants, Healthy
128. Healthcare, Inc., 898 F.2d at 936.
129. Id. at 937-38.
130. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
131. Id. at 345.
132. Healthcare, Inc., 898 F.2d at 939.
133. 1&d This further distinguishes the case from Bose, since the noncommercial nature of
Consumer Reports' speech allowed it to invoke the actual malice standard.
134. Id. See also Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 770
(1979) ('Criticism of commercial conduct does not deserve the special protection of the actual
malice test."). But see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 488 n.l
(1984). In Bose, a manufacturer of audio equipment sued the publisher of Consumer Reports
magazine for product disparagement in a review of a Bose speaker system. Bose was classified
as a public figure, thus triggering the actual malice. standard, because it "actively solicited reviews
in numerous publications thereby inviting critical evaluation and comment on the unique qualities
of the system.' Id. (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1273 (D. Mass.
1981)). In overturning the district court decision, neither the court of appeals nor the United
States Supreme Court passed on the public figure question. Bose, 466 U.S. at 492 n.8.
Furthermore, the speech at issue was not commercial, as it was in Healthcare, Inc. See supra
note 122.
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Hospital and Local Broadcaster. 3 ' However, the Third Circuit analysis
in Healthcare, Inc. indicates that no such protections are afforded to
commercial speech, even if it touches on areas of public concern. A
defamatory statement would therefore be subject to liability under sub-
stantive state law.""
C. Prior Restraint
It is well established that some government restrictions on commer-
cial speech are permissible.37 The permissibility is crucial for news-
commercial hybrids. For example, the government cannot ban news reports
about a state lottery,138 but it can prevent a broadcast station from airing
commercial speech about the same subject.
1 39
The Federal Trade Commission Act"4 declares that "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are declared unlaw-
ful.," 4  States may have statutes which restrict certain forms of commer-
cial speech in areas subject to their regulation. For example, South
Carolina forbids chiropractic facilities from using the term "hospital."142
135. In some jurisdictions, Local Broadcaster may have escaped liability even if the
physician's statement was made with actual malice, under the doctrine of neutral reportage. In
effect, this privilege allows a news media defendant to republish serious charges against a public
figure, assuming the report of the charge is accurate and disinterested. The privilege was first
enunciated in Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, sub nom. New York Times Co. v. Edwards, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977). Twelve states now
formally recognize the privilege, while only two explicitly have rejected it. Libel Defense
Resource Center 50-State Survey (1988) cited and swnmarized in James C. Mitchell, Beyond
McCall: Toward a Neutral Reportage Privilege in Kentucky, KY. BENCH & BAR, Winter 1991,
at 36. See Kathryn D. Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment: The Casefora Constitutional
Privilege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1979). Since commercial speech by either an
advertiser or broadcaster could hardly be considered disinterested or neutral, the privilege is
unlikely to apply to hybrid news-commercials.
136. Healthcare, Inc., 898 F.2d at 939.
137. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
138. New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v. United States, 491 F.2d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 1979)
(en banc), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 907 (1974), cert. vacated and case remanded on other grounds,
420 U.S. 371, aff'd, 519 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975).
139. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2708 (1993).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. 1988).
141. Id.
142. S.C. CODE REos. 61-90 § 101(A) (1989).
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Such rules will be upheld if they pass the four-step Central Hudson test
discussed in Part IV.
In our hypothetical hybrid, the State Medical Review Board wishes
to enjoin Healthy Hospital and Local Broadcaster from airing further paid
segments on experimental lung transplants. As always, the analysis must
begin with a determination of whether or not the speech is commercial. If
it is noncommercial, it is likely to be entitled to full First Amendment
protection. If it is commercial, however, the Central Hudson examina-
tion begins.
To regulate truthful, non-misleading commercial speech, the
government must have a substantial interest.'" Controlling the cost and
quality of health care is clearly a substantial interest and a traditional area
of government authority.
Next, the regulation must directly advance the interest asserted.'
Preventing the advertising of experimental surgeries would advance the
state interest of controlling health care costs by discouraging public demand
for services not currently deemed safe and effective.'" The state's
interest in regulating a commercial transaction gives the state an interest in
speech about that transaction.4" Recall, however, that government could
not regulate a noncommercial discussion of experimental surgery.
Finally, under the Board of Trustees v. Fox modification of Central
Hudson, the regulation must be narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.' There is little doubt that state regulation of commercial
speech will provide the necessary "reasonable fit" with control of health
care. Indeed, the Supreme Court held, in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co.,'49 that where government has the power to ban
an activity altogether, it may ban commercial speech which promotes the
activity.'50
Other regulatory agencies may take a special interest in simulated
news on certain subjects. For example, the Food and Drug Administration
("TDA") is investigating video news releases (promotional materials
143. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
144. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
145. lId
146. It is beyond the scope of this article to debate the wisdom of shaping public behavior
by suppressing commercial speech. For a recent argument against this approach, see United
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (Stevens, L. dissenting).
147. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
148. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
149. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
150. Id. at 346-47.
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prepared to look like news stories) distributed by pharmaceutical compa-
nies. ' The FDA considers this advertising approach insidious, because
viewers do not recognize it as promotion. 52 In other words, it looks like
news, but it's not. 53 Because of this concern, the FDA has been requir-
ing drug companies to submit copies of their video releases for approv-
a.154
Similarly, state agencies charged with regulation of certain sensitive
activities, such as health care, have little difficulty enforcing restrictions on
commercial communication. As previously noted, the South Carolina
chiropractic facility restriction was upheld under a Fox analysis.'55
Nor should the presence of a newscast complicate the analysis. To
justify added constitutional protection, the newscast must be bona fide,
56
not merely a program to insulate advertising. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion ("'TC") has successfully blocked such commercial speech by
establishing that it is inherently false, misleading, and deceptive.'57 For
example, the FTC has filed complaints against the marketers of a so-called
"cash flow system" for presenting commercials that resembled independent
programs. 58 The Commission ordered another sponsor to pay $200,000
for various advertising violations, including the use of programs that were




154. Id. The FDA's right to require prior approval of the message was virtually undisputed.
155. Kale v. Dept. of Health & Envtl. Control, 391 S.E.2d 573, 574-75 (S.C. 1990).
156. Defining a "bona fide" news publication or newscast is not a welcome task for courts,
but at least one has attempted to do so, and its definition was later embraced by the Supreme
Court. In Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., the Second Circuit
suggested that a bona fide publication is one which does not deviate from the customary newspa-
per practices to such an extent that there is a likelihood of deceiving the audience as to its
noncommercial nature. 422 F.2d 1371, 1377 (2d Cit. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
In a later case involving a financial newsletter, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of
independence in establishing publications' bona fide character. There should be "no suggestion
that they contained any false or misleading information, or that they were designed to tout any
security in which petitioners had an interest" Lowe v. Securities & Exchange Conm'n, 472 U.S.
181, 209 (1985) (emphasis added). "Bona fide" means genuine, the Court wrote, not
"masquerading in the clothing of newspapers [or magazines]." 1d, at 208-209.
157. Federal Trade Commission action to date has concentrated on "infomercials" or program
length commercials, which typically run thirty to sixty minutes. See MacLeod testimony, supra
note 9. The FTC has not yet considered the question of hybrid commercials in newscasts.
158. In re Del Dotto Enterprises, Inc., No. 9257, 1993 F.T.C. LEXIS 89 (Apr. 22, 1993).
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"misrepresented to be objective news or documentary programs, rather than
paid ads... "19
Although the FTC seldom describes its actions as "banning" speech, its
use of consent orders has the same effect. For example, in In re Phil-
lips,'60 the Commission obtained an order barring defendants from
making any commercial that misrepresents itself as an independent
program, as opposed to a paid commercial. 6 The commercial in
question was presented as a talk show, with the subject "posing" (the FTC's
disapproving word 62) as a guest extolling the virtues of his small
business start-up system. The order also required any future commercials
to carry the following disclaimer. " he program you are watching is a paid
advertisement."'163 Such requirements seem entirely consistent with the
observation in Virginia Pharmacy that warnings, disclaimers, or changes of
form may be required to prevent commercial speech from being decep-
tive.'r The FT7C recently obtained similar orders against disguised
commercials for hair restorers of questionable usefulness." s
If broadcasters participate in deception, they must expect regulation
or penalties similar to those imposed upon the advertisers themselves.
Broadcast licensees may be punished for sponsorship identification
violations which might deceive the public."6 Indeed, neither intent to
deceive nor actual deception need be present to find a violation.' 67  A
station receives no extra protection because the commercial airs during a
news story. Congress intended that the sponsorship announcement
requirement be observed "even though the program in question might not
be regarded as entirely commercial in content."' 68
159. In re C.C. Pollen Co., No. 902 3145, 1992 F.T.C. LEXIS 304, at *20 (Dec. 30, 1992).
160. No. 9237, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 338 (Jan. 23, 1991).
161. Id at *30.
162. Id
163. Id.
164. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771-72 n.24 (1976). It should be noted here that merely identifying the item as a
commercial with a brief superimposed title ("This is a Commercial" or "Paid Message") is
unlikely to provide sufficient warning. A study of audience reaction recently showed that viewers
usually don't notice such material. David Hazinski, Video News Release Labels Go Unread,
ELEcrRONIc MEDIA, Nov. 4, 1991, at 20.
165. In re Twin Star Prod., No. C-3307, 1990 F.T.C. LEXIS 360 (Oct. 2, 1990).
166. In re Southern California Broadcasting Co., 6 F.C.C.R. 4387 (1991) (quoting Lakewood
Broadcasting Service, Inc., 37 F.C.C.2d 437 (1972)).
167. Id.
168. National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 830 F.2d 270, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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These cases and regulatory decisions establish a solid basis for
government restriction of hybrid news-commercial speech where the
government has a substantial interest in regulating such speech.
D. Endorsements and Testimonials
The FTC's power to prevent deceptive advertising includes controls
on the use of endorsements and testimonials.'" An advertising message
is considered an endorsement if "consumers are likely to believe [that it]
reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experience" of the endorser, not
just the sponsor. 70 The endorser's statements must be honest; he cannot
say he uses a product if he does not. 7 ' On this theory, singer Pat Boone
was fined for falsely claiming that his daughters used an acne medication
with some success.
172
If the endorser purports to be an expert'73 on the subject being
advertised, he must in fact be an expert.m '74 For example, an astronaut
famous for space exploration is not necessarily an expert on automobile
tires."17 If an organization endorses a product or service, the endorsement
must reflect the judgment of the group, and must be reached by a process
sufficient to ensure that the endorsement fairly reflects the collective
judgment of the organization. 176 If the endorsers claim to be or are con-
sidered experts, any endorsement must reflect their independent evalua-
tions."
How do these rules apply to otherwise legitimate newscasts?
Reliability, persuasiveness, sincerity, leadership, charisma and staying
power are among the attributes that advertisers seek in endorsers.
178
Television stations hope that audiences will perceive the same qualities in
169. 15 U.S.C. § 41-58 (1988).
170. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(b) (1993).
171. Id. at § 255.1 (a)(b) (1993).
172. In re Cooga Mooga, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 310 (1978).
173. An expert is defined as "an individual, group or institution possessing, as a result of
experience, study or training, knowledge of a particular subject, which knowledge is superior to
that generally acquired by ordinary individuals." 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(d) (1993).
174. 16 C.F.R. § 255.3 (1993).
175. In re Leroy Gordon Cooper, 94 F.T.C. 674 (1979).
176. 16 C.F.R. § 255.4 (1993).
177. Id.
178. Michael Jones, Celebrity Endorsements: A Case for Alarm and Concern for the Future,
15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 521, 524 (1980) (citing ADVEPTISiNG AGE, Dec. 31, 1973, at 22).
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newscasters, from local reporters to nationally-recognized anchors.'79
News teams are regularly promoted as experts on virtually anything they
cover, working valiantly in pursuit of truth.'
But when reporters are coerced into promoting an advertiser's
product, they not only compromise their professional principles, but are
likely to violate FTC regulations as well. The reporters may not be regular,
satisfied users of the product or service. They seldom will have done
anything to substantiate the truth of their statements. By abandoning their
usual practice as independent reporters, they merely deliver the advertiser's
message. Yet their celebrity status is crucial to the sales pitch, for
advertisers know that commercial information is retained better when a
readily identifiable figure is used.' And what better spokesman than a
supposedly disinterested journalist, one who is thought to be experienced,
trusted, and responsive to the public's need for accurate information? 2
As the FTC has repeatedly noted, the very purpose of advertising with a
news program style is to deceive.' The presence of a journalist controls
the net impression of the advertising message, which is the principal focus
of inquiries by the FTC and the courts.1"'
VI. CONCLUSION
The modem practice of disguising commercials within so-called news
stories increases a news organization's danger of defamation liability. It
may invite prospective plaintiffs and the government to challenge the news-
gathering process in ways which set unwelcome precedents for journalists.
No journalist likes to make a case for regulation of speech. Indeed,
most journalists favor full First Amendment protection for truthful,
nondeceptive commercial speech concerning lawful activities. However, the
law requires broadcasters to exercise special care to segregate their
newscasts from lesser-protected commercial material.
For journalism organizations wondering how to deal with a news-
commercial hybrid, the wisest counsel may be in the old newsroom maxim,
"when in doubt, leave it out." What should be left out is the commercial
179. See generally PETER BOYER, WHO KILLED CBS? 113-118 (1988).
180. BILL McKBBEN, THE AGE OF MISSING INFORMATION 155 (1992).
181. Jones, supra note 178, at 525.
182. See supra notes 179-80.
183. See supra part V.D.
184. Jay Kogan, Celebrity Endorsement: Recognition of Duty, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 47,
58-59 (1987).
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connection, not the real news story. To suggest otherwise would be to
allow over-zealous plaintiffs and regulators to restrict free speech protected
by the First Amendment.
Journalists and their corporate superiors must strengthen their efforts
to discover the news and broadcast it, irrespective of potential sponsors'
wishes. In a tough economic climate, it may not be easy to turn down
revenue. But the highest traditions of independent journalism may demand
it.
Keeping the news content noncommercial is the surest way to protect
newscast integrity. The restrictions discussed here, if carefully applied by
courts, do not chill serious news coverage; they only chill commercials. To
the extent that they chill willingness to pay for serious news coverage, they
show not a failure of the First Amendment, but a failure of journalists'
nerves. This examination has come full circle: if news is acceptable only
when it can be sold, it isn't news. And it may not be protected by the
Constitution."
185. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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